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CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: GETTING
BLACK EXECUTIVES OFF FIRST BASE IN
PROFESSIONAL TEAM-SPORTS

INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-two years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 19641 most major industries have opened their doors to Black executives.2 Not only are Black executives being hired, but many major corporations actively recruit3 Blacks to fill meaningful positions
in corporate America. It is no longer surprising to find Black executives filling positions such as president, vice-president, or general
counsel of major corporations and firms. It would be unrealistic,
would have ochowever, to believe that this social phenomenon
4
curred in the absence of civil rights legislation.
Issues in executive and professional employment cases differ in
certain important respects from those confronted in lower level employment cases. There is judicial concern for the close working relationships required between executive employees and employers.
Over the past two decades, courts have gone far in their interpretations of civil rights legislation to ensure Black participation throughout the work force. As a result, Blacks have gained access to businesses, industries and crafts traditionally closed to them. Black
1

Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 353-66 (1964) (codified as amended

at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
2

For simplicity, this Note refers primarily to Black executives. The discussion,

however, is intended to apply to all racial and ethnic groups historically subjected to
extreme intentional discrimination. The terms "executive" denotes that the minority
person is qualified on the basis of education and experience.
3 Firms which recruit Black executives may be doing so pursuant to an affirmative
action program.
4See US. CONST.

amend. XIV (states can not deny their citizen's equal protection

of the laws); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). This section was a part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and has been used to redress employment discrimination based on race, alienage, and national origin. It serves to assure all persons equal contractual rights. Section 1981 is not applicable to discrimination based on sex. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). This section was a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, applicable to persons
acting "under color of state law" to deprive others of federal rights including employment opportunities.
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executives, however, have made only limited progress in gaining access to meaningful positions 5 in certain industries, notably professional team-sports.6
It is surprising to find relatively few Black executives7 in an industry whose work force consists primarily of Black athletes." This
absence of Black executives in professional sports should concern
many people. Questions are being posed, as to whether general employment principles are properly applicable to the sports business,
or whether the sports industry in fact enjoys a special status similar
to baseball's antitrust exemption. With the growing number of
Blacks achieving the educational standards as well as the practical
experience required for executive positions, it is foreseeable that the
professional team-sport industry will soon face challenges to its executive employment decisions.
This Note addresses inherent problems in applying traditional Title VII standards to executive employment discrimination cases.
Part I discusses organizational similarities that exist among the various team-sport leagues. Part II examines the scope and application
of Title VII as enunciated by Congress and the Supreme Court. Part
III illustrates how the traditional standards, developed in lower level
employment cases, have been construed and applied in executive
discrimination cases. Part IV concludes that although important
standards of Title VII have been distorted, and leniently applied in
upper level employment cases because of the subjectivity of the criteria, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 remains viable for redressing employment discrimination, even against executives.
' Although no attempt is made to define the term "meaningful positions" as used
here, it represents a job which combines an above average salary and the authority to
make important decisions having some effect on the business or industry.
6 This Note focuses on the three major professional team-sports, football, baseball,
and basketball. The discussion in general is applicable to all professional team-sports
as well as other businesses or industries, which employ executive or professional
employees.
Burwell, Scoring in the Front Office, BLACK ENTERPRISB , July 1985, at 43. Black
executives in the professional team-sports industry include: Hank Aaron, Manager of
the Atlanta Braves minor league teams; Gene Burrough, general manager of the now
defunct USFL Houston Gamblers; Paul "Jack" Younger, Assistant General Manager,
Washington Redskins; Wayne Embry, vice president and board member, Milwaukee
Bucks; Al Attles, general manager, Golden State Warriors.
8 Id. at 44. Of the three major team sports, 30% of the professional baseball players of the 26 major league baseball teams are Black. Of the 28 professional football
teams, more than 57% of their players are Black; more than 80% of the players on
the 23 National Basketball Association teams are Black.
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I.

THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS INDUSTRY

Before proceeding to analyze the extent and applicability of Title
VII to Black sports executives, a general review of the characteristics of the leagues comprising the professional sports industry is
appropriate.
The professional team-sports industry is composed of various individual leagues. The structure of professional sport leagues9 is difficult to generalize. The most interested observer only vaguely understands how they work, while courts of law struggle to define them in
legal terms. The terms monopoly, cartel, joint venture, partnership,
or a group of competitors have all been attempted. The leagues comprising the sports industry have some distinct organizational similarities, but also there exist subtle differences.
A good starting point is the owners and players. Their collective
interests are generally asserted through leagues or associations,
clubs, player associations or unions. Another major similarity prevalent throughout the sports industry is the commissioner or
president.
Individual leagues and associations characterize the basic corporate structure. This component of the professional sports industry
divides up territories, allocates exclusive franchises and shares revenues, to varying extents. Usually the major resource shared within a
league or association is its players. The leagues depend upon television rights and gate receipts as their major source of revenues.
The relationship between a league and the clubs within that
league is an uneasy one to say the least. The league is presented as
the unifying and authoritative organization for the various clubs.
Each club within a league has one vote. Nevertheless, it must be
remembered that the clubs are individual business entities. They
take risks and are ultimately responsible only to themselves for
turning a profit or incurring a loss. This has caused both business
and legal problems for the leagues.
The organizational structures of clubs and leagues are similar to
other large corporations or businesses. It is within these two organizations that the absence of Black executives is most noticeable.
Some professional club owners justify the absence of Black executives at these levels by alluding to clubs' and leagues' organizational
structure as being familial in nature. Whether this characterization
The leagues considered here are: the National Basketball Association; Major

League Baseball, American and National Leagues; the National Football League and
the former United States Football League.
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justifies the exclusion of Black executives is questionable at best.
Clubs and leagues generally reflect the owners' interests. Professional athletes, however, rely primarily on unions and player associations to protect their rights. These organizations have received
much attention because of their collective bargaining power, but
neither the player associations nor the unions have made any significant effort to bring to the forefront the issue of the absence of Black
executives in the sporting industry. The last major similarity among
the various sports leagues is the commissioner or president. The
power and status of this individual varies from league to league.
Some observers see the commissioner as a buffer between players
and owners, while others view him as a part of management.
Despite the similarities and differences existing throughout the
professional sports industry, it is commonly accepted that professional team-sports is big business. Although no individual club
would qualify as a member of the "Fortune 500,"'0 the industry as a
whole fits well within this group, and the professional team-sports
industry ranks among the major businesses in America today. 1
The sports industry is within the purview of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The general posits of Title VII ban intentional
discrimination on all job levels. However, recent legal developments
call into question whether the principles applied to assure lower
level jobs will be applied to protect Black executives from discrimination while seeking upper level positions.
II. A

GENERAL TITLE

VII

FRAMEWORK

Aggressive efforts to combat discrimination in employment did
not begin until the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 2 At first, these efforts were usually aimed at lower level jobs,
which represented the great bulk of employment opportunity. Nevertheless, Congress in 1972 expanded Title VII to include both academic institutions 3 and public,'1 4 as well as private, employment.
Today, the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 5 extends as far as Congress' possible reach under its
authority to regulate commerce.' 6 This coverage, however, depends
10

1 R
Id.

BERRY & G. WANG, LAW AND BusiNEss OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY

42 (1986).

See supra note 1.
a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
'

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. Since the early 19th century the Suprem6 Court has
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on a statutory definition given to "an industry affecting commerce,"' 17 and the responsibility for defining this term ultimately
rests with the courts. This responsibility gives the courts much
greater latitude in determining under what circumstances Title VII
will be applicable.
The Civil Rights Act defines the term "employer" broadly.1 8 The
statute however, is applicable only to employers who have fifteen or
more employees on each working day of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year., In drafting Title
VII, Congress did provide exemptions 20 for certain employers. Consequently, the law allows employers to impose hiring restrictions
based on sex, national origin, or religion, but not on race, if such
characteristics are bona fide occupational qualifications. 2
Since the enactment of Title VII, individuals have relied extensively on it to challenge allegedly discriminatory employment practices. Under Title VII a claimant must meet certain procedural requirements to file charges and must also have pursued appropriate
state and federal administrative remedies before initiating a federal
law suit.22 Furthermore, there is no absolute right to a federal trial
under Title VII. 2' Assuming that a plaintiff satisfies the procedural
requisites, there still remains the difficult task of proving that specific employment practices have violated the statute. Thereafter, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing an initial or prima facie case
defined and redefined Congress' power to regulate commerce. At the present the
power to regulate commerce is extremely broad, although not limitless.
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g)-(h) (1982). Courts have defined industry affecting commerce in two parts: commerce is defined broadly to include trade, transportation or

communication among or between the states and a point outside it. It also includes
any activity that would hinder or obstruct commerce.
,842 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),(f)-2 (1982). The term "employee" is defined as an individual employed by an employer. This would appear to exclude applicants for employment; nevertheless, this omission is insignificant, since under Title VII it is unlawful
to refuse to hire "any individual" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
23 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). Courts have relied on
the doctrine of res judicata in holding that an individual cannot maintain a federal
civil rights action when the claim has been reviewed by the state judiciary. See also

Gonzales v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984). The full faith and
credit clause precludes de novo consideration of Title VII cases where decision on
questions has been reached in state court.
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24

of discrimination.
The courts have developed two theories for assessing the merits of
employment discrimination cases. When a plaintiff asserts discriminatory treatment2 5 because of race, sex, national origin, or religion,
proof of the employer's discriminatory motive is required. However,
where neutral policies with a "disparate impact '2 on Blacks are
challenged, no proof of discriminatory intent is required.
For purposes of this Note, the assumption will be made that the
sports industry employs neutral policies that have a disparate impact on Black executives. Pursuing this doctrine, the Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 27 ruled that employment policies having a disparate impact on Blacks were unlawful unless the employer
could show that those policies were job-related and justified by
'28
"business necessity.
It would be difficult for the sports industry to satisfy the Griggs
standards. Under Griggs an employer may not rely on proof that the
selection practices -employed reflect a legitimate business purpose
and are consistent with general practices within the industry. The
business necessity doctrine requires the employer to demonstrate
"that the practice was necessary to the safe and efficient operation
of the business. '29 Even if the employer satisfies the burden of demonstrating a compelling business necessity for the discriminatory
practice, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that the employer's legitimate interest could be served by less discriminatory
means.30
Another approach used in Title VII litigation is a claim of "disparate treatment."31 This approach differs substantially from disparate
impact cases. In order to establish a prima facie case in connection
" Prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination, which if unexplained, is
"[m]ore likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
25 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26 A "disparate impact" case is one in which the plaintiff alleges that a facially
neutral test or employment criterion which disproportionally disqualifies a protected
class from employment, promotion, or other opportunity is not job-related. See id. at
432 (Congress was concerned with the consequences of employment practices, not
just motivation).
27 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 431.
29 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d. 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
SOSee Dochard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
31 Jones v. International Paper Co., 720 F.2d 496 (1983)("disparate treatment" occurs where employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1977).
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with hiring under this approach, the plaintiff must first demonstrate
that he is a member of a protected group under Title VII. The
plaintiff must then show that he applied for a job for which he was
qualified and was rejected despite such qualifications. In addition,
the plaintiff must also show that the position remained open after
his rejection and that the employer continued to seek applicants of
32
the plaintiff's qualifications.
Once a prima facie case of disparate treatment is established, the
employer can rebut the inference of discrimination by specifying a
nondiscriminatory reason for the action. If the employer is successful in, rebutting the inference of discrimination, the plaintiff will
then be given an opportunity to prove that the asserted legitimate
reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.
In disparate treatment cases, the employer is not required to accord preference to minorities or women among equally qualified applicants.3 3 The employer need only explain clearly and specifically
the nondiscriminatory reasons for the action.3 4 The plaintiff carries
the burden of persuasion to prove intentional discrimination by a
35
preponderance of the evidence.
III. JUDICIAL VIEW OF ExEcuTivE TITLE VII CHALLENGES
The Supreme Court has not upheld a different standard for determining discrimination in upper level jobs as opposed to lower level
employment practices. However, some courts have shown a far
greater leniency when presented with cases alleging discrimination
by executive or professional employers than by lower level employers. In Faro v. New York Univ.,3" a sex discrimination case, the
court stated that, "[o]f all fields, which the federal courts should
hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal

court supervision.

''
1

7

The court in Faro seemed hostile to the Title VII claim, describing the plaintiff as a "modern day Jeanne d'Arc fighting for the right
of womanhood on an academic battlefield, facing a solid phalanx of
411 U.S. at 802.
" See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Lee
v. Washington City Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980).
3, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
32

35

Id.

502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 Id. at 1231-32.
20
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men and male prejudice." 38
Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center9 is another example
of judicial deference to executive or professional employers. In
Townsend, a Black female blood bank technician brought a Title
VII action to obtain reinstatement and back pay after she was disqualified from continuing to hold her former position because she
failed to obtain a college degree and failed to pass an examination.
The court, in dictum, seemed to be in favor of relaxing the standards for degree requirements for professional jobs.
[Tihe requirements of a college degree particularly in the sciences,
seems to be in the modern day of advanced scientific method, a heutral requirement for the protection of the public. No doubt such a
requirement could serve as a pretext for racial or sexual discrimination, but this consequence should not be assumed.' 0
In most executive or professional level cases, the traditional Title
VII standards as enumerated in Griggs and its progeny are purportedly applied, but liability is generally denied. A review of upper
level employment cases leads to the conclusion that courts are tacitly applying a different standard to executive employers than to
lower level employers.
Even in the most difficult cases involving lower level employment,
the courts have traditionally been willing to assess an applicant's
qualification in resolving claims of discrimination., 1 In contrast,
courts in upper level cases often profess a lack of expertise and refuse to assess an applicant's qualifications. 4 2 In addition, courts also
tend to be reluctant to allow discovery which would make such assessment possible. 43 As a result, it seems virtually impossible for an
individual Black executive suing a sports league to win, since proof
in such a case involves a prohibitively difficult showing that the employer has subjected comparably qualified individuals of different
races to different treatment.
The manner in which courts deal with certain key procedural isId. at 1231.
558 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977).
40 Id. at 120.
41 Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 940 (1981).
42 See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1371 (W.D. Pa.
1977); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Md. 1977).
43 Compare, Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980) and Keyes v. Lenoir
Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977) with
Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 303-05 (5th Cir. 1973) (discovery should
not be narrowly circumscribed).
8

39
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sues also reflects judicial reluctance to interfere with executive employment practices. For instance, in determining the plaintiff's right
to relief, courts seem to weigh different equities in executive employment cases than in lower level cases. In Albemarle PaperCo. v.
Moody," a lower level employment case, the Supreme Court held
that once liability is determined, the victim of discrimination has a
right to "make whole relief. '45 This includes placement in the job
position they were denied because of discrimination. Nonetheless, in
EEOC v. Kallin,Phillips, Ross, Inc.,46 an executive level discrimination case, the court after determining liability granted the plaintiff
back pay, but denied reinstatement. The court's reasoning follows:
"[t]he employee's job required a close working relationship between
her and top executives of the employer and the three and a half
years of bitter litigation destroyed the possibility of a relationship
with trust and confidence between the employee and employer, the
employee is not entitled to reinstatement."47 Furthermore, potential
litigants may find it difficult to file class actions against executive
employers.'8
IV.

SUBJECTIVITY AND THE DISPARATE DocTRmEs

Under the disparate treatment doctrine,49 an inference of intentional discrimination arises when an employer treats comparably
qualified persons of different races differently. The employer can rebut this inference by explaining the reasons for his employment decision. Should the employer's rebuttal prove successful, the employee is then given the opportunity to show that the employer's
explanation is a pretext for a discriminatory motive, and thereby
prevail. On the other hand the disparate impact doctrine 0 disregards the issue of discriminatory motive and treats all employment
tests or other selection devices that have adverse racial impact as
unlawful discrimination per se, unless the employer shows the jobrelatedness and business necessity for such devices.
44 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

15 Id. at 420-22. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
48 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affld mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
47 Id. at 920.
48 See, e.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 85-89 (3d Cr.), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 931 (1979); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1978);
Peterson v. Albert M. Bender Co., 75 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
49 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 29.
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These doctrines impose heavy burdens on employers to justify objective criteria that have a racial impact on lower level employees.
Courts in lower level employment discrimination cases have consistently struck down objective criteria51 in the absence of convincing
evidence of job-relatedness and business necessity. In executive or
employment cases involving objective criteria having a racial impact,
however, courts have taken a different approach. 52 Applying a significantly softer standard, courts have been willing to accept evidence
of criteria commonly used throughout the business or industry as
persuasive, 5 3 although such evidence carries no weight in lower level
employment cases. Some lower federal courts seem to be disregarding the consequences of objective criteria while applying a "legitimate business purpose" test. This is contrary to the approach used
in Griggs where the Court stated that the consequences of certain
5
employment practices were more important than the motivation. 4
55
The Court there also rejected the legitimate business purpose test.
The scrutiny applied to subjective criteria is much more important than that applied to objective criteria in executive employment
cases under Title VII. Objective criteria such as educational and experience requirements usually are the minimum qualifications for
executive employment. Courts often assume that the minimal objective criteria have been met, and are considered as part of an overall
subjective assessment. This overall subjective assessment is generally based on interviews, previous educational performance and
prior work experience.
Subjective criteria having a racial impact have generally been condemned in lower level employment cases.56 Nevertheless, employers
81 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)(court struck down minimum

height and weight requirements for prison guards); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971)(court struck down high school diploma requirement); Davis v. County
of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625
(1979)(court struck down minimum height standards for firemen); Watkins v. Scott
Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976)(court struck
down high school diploma and equivalence requirement).
" See B. SCHLEI & P. GROssMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 40-41 (Supp.
1979) (objective criteria tend to be struck down in lower level and upheld in upper
level job cases).
53 EEOC v. New York Broadcasting Serv., 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976) (employer's
use of experience as a basis in pay differentials upheld).
401 U.S. at 432 (1971).
8I Id.
See, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 433 (1975) (criticizing subjective rating system as "extremely vague and fatally open to divergent interpretation");
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (subjective criteria
are mechanisms for discrimination against Blacks).
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of upper level executives are allowed to use broad subjective criteria
in hiring employees. One striking example is found in Pierce v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.57 There, the court upheld the use
of subjective criteria to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. In
Pierce seven people applied for an opening as a engineer. Plaintiff
was the only Black applicant.
Plaintiff was denied the job even though he performed well on the
practical test, although not receiving the highest score, and possessed more experience than the white applicant ultimately hired.
Plaintiff made out a prima facie case by showing that the employer
on a previous occasion had hired a white who had just quit his job
because he could not get along with his supervisor.
The employer rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case by showing
that, while plaintiff had more experience than the white applicant
hired, the white applicant produced glowing letters of recommendation, was responsive and forthright in answering questions during
interview, demonstrated initiative by taking night classes on his own
time and had an employment history indicating no problems in
dealing with supervisors, whereas the Black applicant was rambling
and unresponsive in answering interview questions, had no letter of
recommendation, did not show initiative in use of personal time and
openly admitted leaving his previous job because he could not get
along with his supervisor. The court found these subjective evaluations to be valid and not discriminatory per se. 5
In another upper level employment case, Phillips v. Amoco Oil
Co.,59 the court upheld a highly subjective decision-making process
which rejected a Black applicant who scored higher on the pre-employment examination than some applicants who were hired.
. The lenient standards applied to upper level subjective criteria effectively allow interviewers and hiring officials to judge the employability of Black candidates without restraint. Whether racial
bias, consciously or unconsciously, enters into the decision is irrelethe kind of criteria convant under such standards. This is exactly
0
demned by the Court in Albermarle.6

The traditional doctrines of disparate impact and disparate treatment are still very important in assessing employment discrimination cases. Substantial differences exist in these doctrines. Since it is
more difficult to prove discrimination involving disparate treatment
57
58

30 Fair Employment Practice 53 (1982).

Id. at 56.

'1 34 Fair

Employment Practice 137 (1982).

60 422 U.S. at 433.
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than disparate impact, it is important that the underlying facts of a
potential claim be carefully considered. Whether a court's assessment of the nature of the charge is outcome determinative is an
open question at present. The distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact is not always clear. There are differences
of opinion among Supreme Court justices"' and among lower federal
courts 62 regarding what constitutes disparate treatment in contrast
to disparate impact. Moreover, legal principles regarding
the burden
63
of proof in disparate treatment cases are still evolving.
Both doctrines continue to suffer from important similarities.
These consist of three analytically distinct parts: plaintiff's prima
facie case, defendant's defense and plaintiff's response. The factors
accepted as necessary for making out a prima facie case under disparate treatment are flexible and not uniformly applicable in differing factual situations.6 4 Neither approach requires a showing of discriminatory intent and it is conceivable that the two doctrines may
be used simultaneously with appropriate facts in a given fact situation. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters,65 seems to suggest such an approach.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not confronted the issue of determining
which Title VII standards and rules should apply to discrimination
cases involving Black executives. Lower federal courts have seemingly begun to distort these standards in discrimination cases involving executive and professional employees. Given the fact that
executive positions have unique characteristics, resolution of these
discrimination actions becomes all the more difficult. Many courts
feel that subjective evaluation criteria are inescapable in the context
of executive or professional employment. 6
61 See
62

Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)(majority and dissenting opinions).
Compare William v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 839-42

(10th Cir. 1981) with Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 394-405 (5th

Cir. 1981). See also Peters v. Lieuallan, 693 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
11 See Evans v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1982);
Lee v. Russell City Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (factors are (i) that he
belonged to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants, (iii) that despite his qualifications he was
rejected, and (iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-

ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications).
6 438 U.S. 567, 582-83 (1978).
Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.), vacated on
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Broad general rules developed to deal with lower level Title VII
cases may not always be applicable to executive employment cases.
Nevertheless, Title VII remains important to Black executives seeking upper level employment. Application of Title VII principles established in lower level employment cases is proper if due consideration is given to the unique considerations that necessarily go into
executive employment decisions.
Johnny Clyde Parker

other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, reinstated with modification, 526 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1975). See, e.g., EEOC v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 445 F. Supp. 223, 254 (D. Del.
1978) ("[i]t is true that defendant's procedures leave room for the exercise of subjective judgment in the evaluation of potential candidates for both above career level
and supervisory jobs but this fact alone does not make them unlawful. Indeed, it
would not be feasible to eliminate subjective criteria from the selection process for
jobs at these levels."); Frink v. United States Navy, 16 Fair Employment Practice 67,
69-70 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[t]he position in question [naval architect] is fairly sophisticated and technical unlike the occupations often encountered in Title VII cases. Consequently, in selecting employees for promotion, subjective and technical factors necessarily must be considered.")

